Editorial Note: The cases reported in Hong Kong represent the first identified instances of human illness associated with infection with influenza A(H5N1) viruses. Goals of the ongoing investigation are to detect new cases, determine sources of infection and mode(s) of transmission, and identify risk factors for influenza A(H5N1) infection. Except for a cluster of two confirmed and two suspected cases in one family, case-patients are not known to have had contact with each other or a common source of exposure and are geographically distributed throughout Hong Kong. All cases of infection have occurred among residents of Hong Kong, and no cases of infection with influenza A(H5N1) viruses have been identified among persons residing outside Hong Kong.
The serologic data obtained as part of the epidemiologic study of the initial case support the preliminary conclusion that persons with high levels of exposure to infected poultry or direct exposure to the virus in the laboratory may be at increased risk for infection with influenza A(H5N1) virus. However, the investigation has not ruled out the possibility of person-to-person transmission from exposure to ill and infectious persons: two seropositive persons who had contact with the first case-patient included a child-care center classmate and a health-care worker, and the classmate had contact with both the ill child and the same potential environmental source of exposure to ill chickens at the school as the ill child. However, the health-care worker reported no history of exposure to the virus in the laboratory or any recent exposure to poultry, and a history of exposure to the child or to poultry was unknown for a seropositive elderly neighbor. On the basis of the overall low rates of infection among contacts and controls and the lack of seropositivity among family members, at this time, the virus probably is not being efficiently transmitted among humans.
Global surveillance for influenza viruses is critical to monitor the circulation of different strains and indicates that human influenza type A(H3N2), type A(H1N1), and type B viruses continue to circulate worldwide. Data from the Hong Kong Department of Health's influenza surveillance system indicate that the number of cases of ILI in Hong Kong is at normal levels for this period; however, during December, the number of human influenza viruses isolated increased. During December, influenza A(H3N2) was the most commonly isolated influenza strain in Hong Kong, although influenza A(H1N1) and B viruses also were identified. The currently available inactivated trivalent influenza vaccine contains influenza A(H1N1), A(H3N2), and B strains repre-sentative of those currently circulating among humans and is recommended for persons at increased risk for influenza-related complications (2 ) .
Information about influenza A(H5N1) activity in Hong Kong and the United States and international influenza surveillance data are available through CDC's Influenza Branch, Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National Center for Infectious Diseases, World-Wide Web site http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/flu/fluvirus.htm. Editorial Note: Although rubella is typically a mild, self-limited disease in adults, infection in pregnant women can result in serious adverse health outcomes for the fetus, including CRS, a group of birth defects including deafness, cataracts, heart defects, and mental retardation. In the United States, approximately 10% of young adults are susceptible to rubella; in other countries, some without routine vaccination policies for rubella, susceptibility rates for rubella range from 4% to 68% (3 ) . During 1994-1996, 12 laboratory-confirmed cases of CRS were reported in the United States (4 ) .
Although a definitive quantitation of the risk for transmission of rubella among crew members and passengers on the cruise ships could not be ascertained, risk for infection among those crew members of cruise ship B could be estimated. Results of the serosurvey among crew members indicate that at least 41 (11%) of 366 were acutely infected with or susceptible to rubella at the time of the serosurvey. This serosurvey was conducted after recognition of an ongoing outbreak of rash illnesses among crew members, and it is likely that rubella susceptibility rates at the outset of the outbreak would have been higher.
The risk for transmission of infection and an outcome of CRS in pregnant passengers in their first trimester of pregnancy on cruise ship B was difficult to determine because 1) the rubella immune status of these pregnant passengers was unknown and 2) the consequences of rubella infection in susceptible pregnant women (i.e., CRS) may not be evident for several months after the exposure. If pregnant passengers were exposed, and assuming that approximately 10% of these women were susceptible to rubella and 85% of susceptible pregnant women who are infected during their first trimester will give birth to an infant with CRS, one case of CRS could potentially occur each week among passengers sailing during the outbreak.
Minimizing or eliminating the risk for rubella exposure among susceptible pregnant women is important because of the potential for serious adverse health outcomes for the fetus. To interrupt transmission of rubella among crew members and to prevent transmission of infection and CRS among susceptible pregnant women, CDC recommended administration of MMR to all crew members lacking documented immunity to rubella; serologic testing to determine susceptibility to rubella for all crew members ineligible for vaccination, including pregnant women; active surveillance aboard the ship to detect new rubella infections; prospective notification of the potential risk for rubella exposure to all embarking passengers until 30 days after the last confirmed rubella infection; and retrospective notification to all passengers sailing during the period of potential rubella transmission. These recommendations were effective in interrupting rubella transmission among crew members on cruise ship B: no additional rash illnesses were identified after their implementation.
This report of two clusters of rubella infections on commercial cruise ships demonstrates that crew members-many from countries without routine rubella vaccination programs-are potential groups of susceptible persons at risk for rubella infection. To prevent future rubella outbreaks among such persons, CDC recommends that cruise lines administer MMR to all crew members without documented immunity to rubella. Although reported rubella cases in these two outbreaks were limited to crew memVol. 46 / Nos. 52 & 53bers, cruise ship travel provides a semi-closed environment for crew and passenger interactions, conducive to the potential spread of rubella and many other infectious diseases among crew and passengers. To prevent transmission of rubella infection and subsequent CRS, women of childbearing age, particularly pregnant women, should be immune to rubella before cruise ship excursions or international travel.
The outbreaks described in this report illustrate the potential for transmission of infectious disease among persons traveling across international borders, including aboard commercial cruise ships. Previous infectious disease outbreaks reported among crew members and passengers have included diarrheal diseases and other vaccine-preventable diseases such as influenza (5 ) . Approximately 4 million persons travel aboard North American cruise ships each year (CDC, unpublished data, 1998). Ensuring routinely recommended adult vaccinations for all crew members will substantially decrease the potential for future outbreaks of vaccine-preventable illnesses aboard cruise ships. All suspected cases of rubella and other notifiable vaccinepreventable diseases should be reported to the nearest state and local health department. State health departments should report all suspected cases of rubella to CDC's Child Vaccine-Preventable Disease Branch, Epidemiology and Surveillance Division, National Immunization Program, telephone (404) 639-8230.
Rubella -Continued

Enhanced Medical Assessment Strategy for Barawan Somali Refugees -Kenya, 1997
Barawan Somali Refugees -Continued Each year, approximately 100,000 refugees are resettled to the United States. Before resettlement, these refugees undergo medical screening to identify inadmissible conditions (e.g., infectious tuberculosis and human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] infection) among individual refugees. This report describes the implementation and results of an enhanced refugee medical assessment strategy among Barawan Somali refugees in Kenya during July 1997. This strategy employs population-based screening for parasitic infections. The findings indicate that, among these refugees, the prevalences of malaria and intestinal parasites were sufficient to warrant preembarkation therapy to improve the health of both individuals and the total refugee population. This therapy also may prevent local transmission of parasitic infections in the resettlement communities in the United States.
In May 1997, resettlement began for approximately 4000 Barawan Somali refugees encamped since 1992 near Mombasa, Kenya. In 1993, detection of substantial malaria parasitemia (15%) among Somali refugees from this region prompted recommenda-tion of antimalarial treatment before resettlement (1 ) . In addition, high prevalences of malaria (30%) and intestinal parasites (60%-80%) had been reported among residents of Kenya living in the coastal region, including Mombasa (S.K. Sharif, M.D., Ministry of Health, Kenya, personal communication, 1997). Because the prevalence of parasitic infections among the Barawan refugees may reflect those of the local community, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) consulted CDC on appropriate preembarkation interventions for Barawan refugees. IOM, a nongovernmental organization, medically screens more than half of the refugees resettling to the United States. CDC interim recommendations included mass pre-embarkation therapy with singledose sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) for malaria parasitemia and mebendazole (100 mg twice a day for 3 days) for intestinal helminths. During July 1997, CDC conducted a cross-sectional survey of an approximately 10% sample of refugees during the standard medical screening process to 1) determine the prevalences of malaria and intestinal parasites, 2) reevaluate recommended pre-embarkation therapies, 3) assess the effectiveness of the antimalarial regimen, and 4) evaluate the laboratory component of medical screening.
IOM provided information about two groups: refugees examined during February 3-June 23 (travel-approved population, n=3253) and refugees examined during July 7-17 (survey population, n=390). Basic characteristics of the two groups (i.e., age, sex, country of origin, and size of family unit) were similar. Members of the survey population were asked about histories of recent illness and use of medications and other antimalarial preventive measures. A local hospital laboratory screened members of the survey population for malaria by using a qualitative buffy-coat (QBC) test followed by confirmation of all QBC-positives using microscopic examination of Field's-stained blood smears; persons who were positive for malaria were retested 3 and 7 days following completion of antimalarial therapy. Stool specimens were screened at a local hospital for intestinal parasites by direct and formalin ether-concentrated smears. CDC performed quality-control assessments for both the malaria smears and stool samples.
Malaria
Of the 390 survey participants, 26 (7%; 95% confidence interval [CI]=4%-10%) were positive for malaria. Of the 26 who were positive, 25 had Plasmodium falciparum parasitemia, and one had P. ovale parasitemia. Because of the severity of the parasitemia and symptoms, the local hospital treated seven of the 26 malaria-positive persons with halofantrine or artemether. Nineteen received a weight-adjusted dose of SP. One patient receiving SP was lost to follow-up. Of the remaining 18 patients receiving SP, 13 were malaria-negative on day 3 of follow-up, and all were malaria-negative by day 7.
Of the surveyed population, recent febrile symptoms were reported by 20% and 37% during initial and follow-up questioning, respectively ( Table 1) . Use of antimalarial therapy (chloroquine, halofantrine, SP, or quinine) was common among those refugees reporting fever (71% and 93%, respectively). Ten percent of the surveyed refugees reported using any malaria chemoprophylaxis, and most (91%) reported using bed nets ( A total of 37 randomly selected blood smears from refugees reported as parasitenegative by the local hospital were reviewed by CDC and confirmed as negative. However, of the 26 refugees reported as parasite-positive, two cases of P. falciparum parasitemia could not be confirmed by CDC. The smear diagnosed by the local hospital as P. ovale was identified by CDC as P. falciparum.
Intestinal Parasites
Stool specimens were obtained from 331 persons; of these, specimens from 129 (39%) were positive for one or more pathogenic intestinal parasites, including Trichuris trichiura (28%), Ascaris lumbricoides (9%), and other pathogens ( Table 2) . Sex-specific prevalences were similar (41% for females versus 37% for males, chisquare test=0.47, p=0.49). However, age-specific prevalence was higher for persons Editorial Note: Although the prevalences of parasitic infections among the Barawan refugees were lower than the prevalences of these infections among persons in the surrounding communities, the prevalences of malaria (7%) and intestinal parasites (39%) among Barawan Somali refugees encamped in Kenya were sufficient to warrant pre-embarkation therapies. The strategy of screening for parasitic infections among a subset of refugees before resettlement provided an opportunity to assess the need for public health interventions for the entire Barawan refugee population. This strategy optimized the efficient distribution of these therapies before the refugees were resettled to the United States. This screening strategy also may be used to determine the need for other pre-embarkation therapies among future refugee populations. However, because the magnitudes of exposures and risks may vary among different groups, the use of specific interventions may differ by refugee group. CDC oversees refugee health screening in accordance with the Refugee Act of 1980.* The law requires that refugees with medical conditions potentially affecting the public's health be identified and treated; the quality of medical screening and related health services be monitored and assessed; and that health officials in resettlement communities be notified of identified medical conditions. Refugee medical assessments previously focused on identifying inadmissible medical conditions. The enhancement of the medical screening process described in this report emphasizes the expansion of screening to include parasitic diseases with the potential for local transmission in the resettlement community (2,3 ) and a broadening of the focus from the individual to a population.
As a result of the findings of the enhanced assessment of Barawan Somali refugees, CDC recommended continuation of mass pre-embarkation therapy (day before departure) for malaria infection with SP for all departing refugees who had no contraindication to therapy (i.e., sulfa allergy). This recommendation was based on three considerations. First, the prevalence of parasitemia (7%) may have been underestimated because of the extensive use of presumptive antimalarial therapy for fever. Second, single-dose SP provides adequate cost-effective therapy for P. falciparum. Although the small number of refugees treated with SP (n=19) precluded accurate assessment of the effectiveness of SP, all refugees were malaria-negative by day 7 following SP therapy (n=18, one lost to follow-up). Third, mass pre-embarkation therapy effectively treats symptomatic persons and reduces asymptomatic malaria parasitemia among the entire refugee population, thereby reducing the risk for imported P. falciparum malaria.
Because some Barawan Somali refugees were infected with both helminthic and protozoan pathogens, the interim recommendation for mass pre-embarkation therapy with 3-day mebendazole was changed to single-dose albendazole (400 mg per kg of body weight) for all persons except pregnant women. † This approach was considered preferable because of the high prevalence of mixed intestinal parasites, the low cost of albendazole, and the ease of single-dose therapy before departure (4-6 ). The optimal choices of agent(s) and duration of therapy for mass treatment of intestinal parasites among refugee populations remain to be determined.
The program of enhanced screening for and management of infectious diseases among this vulnerable refugee population enabled the implementation of populationbased interventions before members of this group dispersed to multiple locations in ≥20 states. CDC is notifying health officials in the states in which refugees are being resettled of the results of the pre-embarkation medical screening and treatment. CDC also is working with IOM and state refugee health programs to develop a shared database of refugee medical screening results.
Barawan Somali Refugees -Continued
Evaluation of HIV Case Surveillance Through the Use of Non-Name Unique IdentifiersMaryland and Texas, 1994-1996
HIV Case Surveillance -Continued Notifiable disease reporting laws or regulations in states and territories require reporting of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) cases, including patient and physician names, to state or local health authorities. As of January 1, 1998, a total of 31 states were conducting name-based human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) case surveillance by using the same methods as surveillance for AIDS. However, because of concerns about name-based HIV surveillance, Maryland and Texas implemented HIV surveillance using non-name unique identifiers (UI)*. This report summarizes a 3-year collaboration by CDC and these states to evaluate UI surveillance for HIV infec-*Reporting in Maryland is exempted for nonstate residents; persons who are tested at anonymous test sites; are blood, semen, or tissue donors; and participants of certain research projects. No exemptions to reporting exist in Texas. † Albendazole is currently approved by the Food and Drug Administration for treatment of neurocysticercosis and hydatid disease. tion; the findings indicate some limitations to the use of a Social Security numberbased UI for HIV surveillance.
In both Maryland and Texas, UI surveillance for HIV was implemented in early 1994, and both used the same 12-digit numeric UI code (comprising the last four digits of the patient's Social Security number [SSN] , six-digit [month/day/year] date of birth [DOB], one-digit code for race/ethnicity, and one-digit code for sex). HIV-infection reports included residence data, diagnosing facility, and date of test, but did not include mode of HIV exposure. In both states, UI HIV surveillance databases were maintained separately from name-based AIDS surveillance databases.
Evaluation criteria included the proportion of reports with full UI codes, timeliness and completeness of HIV reporting, and potential for matching the UI-based case reports to alternate databases. In Texas, selected HIV reports also were evaluated for ability to follow back UI reports to patient records; in Maryland, provider compliance with maintaining patient surveillance logs was assessed. During July 1994-December 1996, Maryland reported 6412 AIDS cases and received 9971 HIV-infection reports, and Texas reported 12,041 AIDS cases and received approximately 23,000 HIVinfection reports.
Maryland
In 1993, the Maryland legislature mandated UI reporting of both positive HIV tests and patients with CD4+ T-lymphocyte counts of <200 cells/µL (CD4+) † . Health-care providers requesting HIV or CD4+ tests are required to construct the UI code for each patient, include the code on the laboratory slip, and record it in a surveillance log that matches the UI to patient identifiers (e.g., medical record number, patient name, or other patient code) for purposes of case investigation and follow up. Laboratories licensed by Maryland are required to submit the UI-based reports to the state health department through the local health departments.
Of 9971 HIV-infection reports entered during July 1994-December 1996, all UI elements were present for 7119 (71%) ( Table 1) . Element-specific presence ranged from 78% (SSN) to 98% (DOB and sex). The proportion of reports with full UI increased during July 1994-June 1996, and declined slightly during July-December 1996. The median time from date of HIV test to receipt of report by the state health department was 20 days (range: 1-847 days). During October-November 1997, all 72 providers in nine counties of eastern Maryland (the counties reported 3% of AIDS cases in Maryland in 1996) for whom laboratories had submitted HIV-infection reports were contacted to determine the proportion of providers who maintain the required surveillance log linking UI to patient identifiers; 32 (44%) of these providers maintained logs.
Completeness of HIV-infection reporting was estimated by comparison to cases of AIDS reported in the AIDS surveillance registry. Of AIDS cases with dates of HIV diagnosis from July 1995 through June 1996, data elements to construct UI were available for 633 (85%) cases. Of these, 319 (50%) matched to HIV-infection reports with full UI in the UI database (Table 2) .
Data from the Maryland HIV counseling and testing (C&T) system (excluding sites offering only anonymous HIV tests) were used to evaluate the proportion of records with full UI and completeness of HIV-infection reporting. In early 1995, counselors were instructed to obtain UI code information from clients and record the UI on the HIV C&T record. During 1995-1996, a total of 1093 records with a positive HIV test were entered into the C&T database; of these, all UI elements were present for 94%. HIV C&T reports for persons who had HIV diagnosed from July 1995 through June 1996 were matched to the UI database. Of the 528 reports, 276 (52%) matched.
Texas
In 1994, the Texas Board of Health amended regulations to require named reporting of HIV-infected children aged <13 years and UI reporting of HIV-infected adolescents and adults. Both health-care providers ordering an HIV test and laboratories performing the test report confirmed HIV infections to the Texas Department of Health (TDH) through the local health departments. Neither providers nor laboratories are required to maintain registries linking UI to patient identifiers.
Approximately 23,000 HIV-infection reports were received at TDH during the evaluation period. Since 1995, TDH excluded approximately 7000 paper HIV reports with three or more missing UI data elements. Of 16,119 HIV-infection reports entered into the UI database, all UI elements were present for 9923 (62%) ( Table 1) . Elementspecific presence ranged from 66% (SSN) to 97% (sex). Overall, 60% of reports were submitted in periodic batches, which had a longer time from date of HIV test to receipt by TDH (median: 173 days; range: 26-974 days) than the 40% of reports submitted individually (median: 59 days; range: 2-906 days).
Completeness of HIV-infection reporting was estimated by comparison to AIDS surveillance data using the same methodology as in Maryland. Data elements to construct UI were available for 1762 (79%) of AIDS cases with dates of HIV diagnosis in the *Excludes approximately 7000 records that had three or more missing UI data elements. † Proportion of all reports containing specific UI data elements.
specified period (Table 2) . Of these, 454 (26%) matched to HIV-infection reports with full UI in the UI database.
To evaluate the feasibility of epidemiologic follow up, TDH sampled 765 HIVinfection reports submitted during January 1995-June 1996, in six areas of the state, reflective of variation in geography, demography, HIV morbidity, and reporting sources. Of these, 456 (60%) could be matched to a client record using any combination of UI (including records without full UI), health-care provider name, date of test, residential information, and other locally available information. Matched records that were missing the SSN data element (n=208) were reviewed to determine whether these data could be located. SSN could not be located for 120 (58%) of these records. Editorial Note: HIV and AIDS surveillance data are needed to provide reliable population-based data to guide public health programs. During 1995-1996, the first declines in the incidence of AIDS-opportunistic infections and AIDS deaths were reported in the United States (6% and 23%, respectively), in part, as a result of increasingly effective HIV therapy (1 ). On the basis of revised HIV treatment guidelines (2 ), the impact of treatment advances on AIDS trends is expected to continue and will reduce the usefulness of AIDS data alone to monitor HIV-infection trends and morbidity. CDC and other public health and advocacy organizations have recognized the need for national HIV case surveillance while continuing to discuss the relative merits of HIV surveillance methods based on numeric codes compared to the name-based approach employed for AIDS surveillance (1,3 ) . CDC uses established criteria to evaluate performance of public health surveillance systems to provide accurate data to target prevention and care programs (4 ). States conduct active surveillance using existing name-based clinical and public health records to decrease the reporting burden on providers, eliminate duplicate reports, and facilitate epidemiologic follow-up. These methods enable AIDS surveillance to attain high performance standards as reflected by completeness of reporting (>85%) (5 ) and documentation of risk exposures (≥93% of cases) (6 ) . Evaluation of name-based HIV surveillance has shown 74%-97% completeness of reporting (7; CDC, unpublished data, 1997), and documentation of risk exposures (≥76% of cases) (6 ). Secure and confidential surveillance practices are required as a condition for receipt of federal resources for HIV and AIDS surveillance. At the state level, the most comprehensive protections of medical data apply to government-held data, and most specifically to HIV-related data (8 ) . Names are removed before encoded and encrypted AIDS or HIV surveillance data are transmitted to CDC.
The evaluations in Maryland and Texas indicated that the use of UIs limits the performance of an HIV surveillance system and complicates efforts to collect riskbehavior information. Both systems demonstrated timely reporting. Although data from both states indicated increases in reporting of the SSN data element during the evaluation period, overall 22% of reports in Maryland and 34% in Texas were missing the SSN element, which contributed to a high rate of incomplete case reporting. The follow-back investigation in Texas suggests that SSNs are not readily available in client or medical records but, in the controlled environment of the Maryland HIV C&T system, counselors were able to collect SSNs for most clients. The completeness of reporting also may be affected by the ability of providers and laboratories to use UIs as part of routine HIV-testing practices. For example, one large laboratory providing HIV-testing services in Maryland did not report HIV infections during the evaluation period. The difficulty in collecting HIV data when persons are tested out of state also may affect completeness of reporting and the ability to eliminate duplicate reports. Maryland is continuing to evaluate its UI surveillance system, and Texas is exploring alternative HIV surveillance systems with input from community groups.
Effective HIV surveillance systems must include HIV risk information; however, this information often is not available at the time of the initial UI case report, and follow-up with health-care providers is necessary. To supply follow-up information, health-care providers must use lists or other mechanisms to link the UI to patient identifiers. The UI approach complicates efforts to collect this information and increases the number of lists of HIV-infected persons that could be disclosed in a breach of confidentiality.
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